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June 15, 2016
Abstract
In Penn World Table (PWT) 8.1, several developing countries stand out as outliers
with high total factor productivity (TFP) levels relative to the United States (U.S.).
For example, in 2011, Zimbabwe and Trinidad and Tobago are reported to have 3 and
1.6 times higher TFP levels than the U.S., respectively. In addition, for several other
countries, such as Turkey and Gabon, the stated levels of TFP are very similar to
that of the U.S. level (1.01 and 1.11 times the U.S. levels, respectively). Estimates
for some of these countries seem rather unlikely when compared with other measures
of productivity (such as output per worker). While in the construction of TFP levels
PWT does use country-specific factor shares we show that their results are very similar
to calculating TFP levels with a Cobb-Douglas production function where capital and
labor shares are assumed to be the same across all countries, i.e., using a constant
labor share of 2/3 for all countries. A simple modification, using a constant labor
share of 2/3 for developed countries and 1/2 for developing countries, generates more
“plausible” estimates for TFP levels.
JEL classification: O11, O40, O47
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1 Introduction
One of the most important tasks in the study of economic growth and development is un-
derstanding the causes and consequences of productivity differences across countries.1 The
Penn World Table (PWT) has been one of the core sources for reliable data for such compar-
isons. It provides data on gross domestic product (GDP) at purchasing power parity (PPP),
measures of relative levels of income, output, inputs, and productivity with country and
period coverage depending on the release.2 The first PWT, PWT 5.6, includes 152 countries
and territories, for the period 1950-1992. The latest PWT is the PWT 8.1, which covers 167
countries between 1950 and 2011.3 PWT 8.0 and PWT 8.1 include a variable labeled ‘ctfp,’
which reports the measured total factor productivity (TFP) series for each country relative
to the U.S. (TFP level at current PPPs, U.S.=1).





Note: ZWE: Zimbabwe, KWT: Kuwait, MAC: China: Macao SAR, QAT: Qatar, TTO: Trinidad and Tobago,
NOR: Norway, IRL: Ireland, GAB: Gabon, HKG: China: Hong Kong SAR, SGP: Singapore, TWN: Taiwan,
SAU: Saudi Arabia, TUR: Turkey.
Figure 1: TFP levels in 2011 (relative to the U.S)
Figure 1 displays TFP levels relative to the U.S. TFP level for a number of countries
using this measure, ‘ctfp’, from PWT 8.1 for 2011. Several countries stand out with TFP
levels higher than the U.S. TFP level. For example, Zimbabwe and Trinidad and Tobago
have 3 and 1.6 times higher TFP levels than that of the U.S., respectively. In addition, TFP
levels of some other countries, such as Turkey and Gabon, are very similar to that of the
1Many studies provide documentation of TFP levels across countries (see, for example, Islam, 1995, 2001;
Hall and Jones, 1999; Helpman, 2004; Jones and Romer, 2010; Hsieh and Klenow, 2010; Jones, 2015).
2Although data from the PWT are widely used across the world, there is a literature questioning the
reliability of data in different versions of the PWT from several angles. See, for example, Knowles, 2001;
Dowrick, 2005; Ponomareva and Katayama, 2010; Breton, 2012, 2015; Johnson et al., 2013; Pinkovskiy and
Sala-i-Martin, 2016.
3All versions of the PWT are available at: http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/
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U.S. Are all the TFP levels reported in PWT 8.1 reasonable? Examining another measure
of productivity, GDP per worker, raises some questions about the reliability of the TFP
measure for some of these countries. For example, in 2011, GDP per worker in Zimbabwe
was only 25.9% of the U.S. GDP per worker, even though Zimbabwe’s TFP level was 3 times
that of the U.S.
In Figure 2, we plot measured TFP levels (ctfp) against output per worker in 2010 and
in 2011 for 111 countries using PWT 8.1.4 The correlation between the two series is 0.81 in
2010 and 0.71 in 2011. If we exclude Zimbabwe, the correlation between two series increases
to 0.89 in both 2010 and 2011. Zimbabwe is clearly an outlier in this sample.
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Figure 2: Reported TFP in PWT 8.1 in 2010 and 2011
It is of course possible for some countries to have higher TFP levels than the U.S. Indeed,
several studies provide explanations for seemingly surprisingly high TFP levels in some
countries. For example, resource-rich countries such as Gabon, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia are among the top countries in terms of TFP levels. The likely reason for this
observation seems to be their high productivity in oil production. According to data from
the World Bank, oil rent to GDP was 58.6% in Kuwait, 48.8% in Saudi Arabia, 45.3% in
Gabon, and 29.9% in Qatar in 2011. Oil rent to GDP was also more than 10% in Norway and
Trinidad and Tobago.5 Hall and Jones (1999) also report similar observations and subtract
4We use the variable ctfp for TFP levels. This measure of TFP of the PWT is based on a Tornqvist index
of inputs that incorporates variations in factor shares (see Feenstra et al., 2015). This point is also mentioned
in Jones (2015). We use the variable cgdpo (output-side real GDP at current PPPs (in mil. 2005US$)) for
GDP and the variable emp (number of persons engaged (in millions)) for employment. Using these two
variables, we calculate GDP per worker (labor productivity). We use data for 111 countries, since data for
the variable ctfp are reported for these countries.
5Oil rents are the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of
production. Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2016).
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the value added in the mining industry from GDP in computing their measure of output to
deal with the issue.
It is also the case that several countries stand out as outliers or extreme cases in different
studies that compare productivity levels across countries. For example, Puerto Rico stands
out as the most productive country in 1998 in Hall and Jones (1999), in which Hall and Jones
(1999) use the PWT 5.6. Hall and Jones (1999, footnote 8) note that an overstatement of
real output in Puerto Rico might be responsible for such a finding.6
However, it is not clear why countries such as Turkey or Zimbabwe have higher TFP levels
than the U.S. In this paper, we argue that the choice of the value for the shares of labor and
capital for developing versus developed countries is likely to be the culprit behind some of the
extreme TFP levels reported in PWT. While in the construction of TFP levels, PWT does use
country specific factor shares, we show that their results are very similar to calculating TFP
levels with a Cobb-Douglas production function where capital and labor shares are assumed
to be the same across all countries, i.e., using a constant labor share of 2/3 for all countries.
While Gollin (2002) argues that factor shares adjusted for self-employed income and sectoral
composition are remarkably constant across countries and Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001)
find no systematic tendency for country labor shares to vary with per capita income, other
studies have argued that labor income shares in developing countries should be less than the
corresponding shares in developed countries (Chen et al., 2010; Izyumov and Vahaly, 2015).
There may be compelling reasons to investigate this issue further, as different factor shares
generate very different conclusions about relative TFP levels for many countries. We show
that a simple modification, using a constant labor share of 2/3 for developed countries and
1/2 for developing countries, generates more plausible estimates for differences in TFP levels
between the U.S and several developing countries, including Zimbabwe and Turkey. Overall,
we show that the level of factor shares used in these calculations makes a big impact on
the comparison of TFP levels across countries and conclude that the relative TFP measure
reported in PWT should be used with caution.
We note that our paper is silent on the trend changes in labor share. There is recent
evidence pointing to declines in the labor share of production in most OECD countries in
the last three to four decades. There has been a new emerging literature documenting and
investigating different explanations for this phenomenon (see, for example, Elsby et al., 2013;
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). Some argue that these negative trends in labor share
call into question the appropriateness of a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function,
with constant factor shares under competitive factor markets (Jayadev, 2007; Rodriguez
and Jayadev, 2010). We abstract from this issue in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a common framework to measure
TFP levels and provides an alternative method where we treat labor income share to be
6In addition, differences in methodology matter; according to the results of several approaches, differences
in TFP levels across countries are substantial. This case is well noted in Helpman (2004). Helpman (2004,
p. 29) compares the findings of Islam (1995) and Hall and Jones (1999) and states the following observation:
“Yet the estimated relative productivity levels differ substantially for some countries. An extreme example
is Jordan, for which Islam’s estimate is 25 percent of U.S. productivity while Hall and Jones’s estimate is
about 120 percent of U.S. productivity. These differences notwithstanding, both series of estimates show
large cross-country variations in TFP.” Islam (1995) uses an econometric approach and panel data estimation
while Hall and Jones (1999) use neoclassical assumptions about production to get the parameters.
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different between developed and developing countries. Section 3 presents the results of
alternative methods and compares the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Framework for Measured TFP
2.1 A Common Method
A well-known approach to calculate TFP levels in the development literature can be sum-
marized, á la Caselli (2005), as follows. Labor productivity is apportioned, yit, between
endowments and TFP using the following constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy:









where A, K, h, and α are, respectively, TFP, the stock of capital, human capital per worker,
and capital factor income share. This form is re-written in an intensive form to arrive at the










where k (≡ K/E) represents capital deepening. Expressing the country i performance






















t, there is a tendency of using a common value of α = 1/3 for
each country in the related literature.7 This way of calculating TFP is widely used in many
studies, such as Jones and Romer (2010), Hsieh and Klenow (2010), and Jones (2015). We
call this approach Method 1.
Method 1: αi = αUS = 1/3. (4)
There has been a tradition arguing that the factor shares in national income are roughly
constant over time. The reference for this argument is based on Kaldor’s stylized facts for
the United States (see Kaldor, 1961). Gollin (2002) argues that factor shares adjusted for
self-employed income and sectoral composition are remarkably constant across both time and
countries, and that the capital shares cluster around one-third. In line with Gollin (2002),
Bernanke and Gürkaynak (2001) find no systematic tendency for country labor shares to




t as well as α
i
t. In previous versions, there were no
data for human capital. Data for human capital reported in PWT 8.0 and PWT 8.1 are consistent with
the previous studies, i.e., data for average years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (2013) and data for
returns to education are from Psacharopoulos (1994). Mincerian approach allows for conversion into years of
schooling. See Caselli (2005) on how to construct human capital data using information from Psacharopoulos
(1994) and Barro and Lee (2013).
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vary with per capita income. Setting a common value of α = 1/3 for each country has been
a widely used practice in cross-country studies since then.
2.2 A Simple Modification
Method 1 rests on unification of factor shares across countries. A comparative perspective
of countries at different levels of income (developing versus developed countries) may reveal
some features of the relationship between the magnitude of the capital/labor income share
and TFP differences that cannot be observed from Method 1.
Recent cross-country studies point to the observation that factor income shares might
differ between developed and developing countries. For example, Izyumov and Vahaly (2015)
contradict the factor income share conversion hypothesis for the 1990-2008 period (using a
group of 55 developed and developing countries) and argue that a country in the middle of
development distribution will have labor share that is 10-15 percentage points below that
of a typical OECD country. Similarly, Chen et al. (2010) use 0.5 as the labor share for
developing economies, because labor is cheap compared with advanced countries, leading to
a lower labor share. Trapp (2015) discusses the challenges of measuring the labor income
share of developing countries studying developing countries from 1990 to 2011 and argues
that the average level of labor share is around 0.47. In addition to cross-country studies,
there are some country-specific studies that argue that the value of labor share parameter
in developing countries such as China and Turkey is around 0.5.8 The idea of using different
labor shares for developing countries is also supported by Young and Lawson (2014) who
study the relationship between the institutions of economic freedom and labor shares in a
panel of up to 93 countries covering 1970 through 2009. They find that countries with higher
economic freedom scores tend to have higher labor shares.9
In accordance with these discussions, we modify Method 1 as follows:
Method 2:

αi = 1/2 if country i is a developing country
αi = 1/3 if country i is a developed country
αUS = 1/3.
(5)
To implement this method, we group countries according to different levels of economic
development. First, the data of all economies are grouped into four categories of status
of economic development according to the World Bank. In the World Bank’s classification
system, economies are ranked by their levels of gross national income (GNI) per capita. These
economies are then classified as low-income countries (L), lower-middle-income countries
(LM), upper-middle-income countries (UM), and high-income countries (H). The income
group thresholds are updated annually at the beginning of the World Bank’s fiscal year with
an adjustment for inflation. This annual adjustment reflects the economies’ development
experiences. For example, China is classified as a low-income economy in 1990, a lower-
middle-income country in 2000, and an upper-middle-income country in 2010. The World
8See Bai et al., 2006; Brandt et al., 2008; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Zhu, 2012; Dollar and Jones, 2013 for
China; Altuğ et al., 2008; Ismihan and Metin-Özcan, 2009; and Tiryaki, 2011 for Turkey.
9Young and Lawson (2014) report that the average labor share between 1970 and 2009 is 0.599 in Switzer-
land and 0.163 in Niger.
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Bank reports the following thresholds in 2010:10 Low-income countries are defined as having
a per capita GNI in 2010 of $1,005 or less; lower-middle-income countries have incomes
between $1,006 and $3,975; upper-middle-income economies have incomes between $3,976
and $12,275; and high-income economies have incomes $12,276 or more. Second, equipped
with the World Bank classification at hand, we group the countries under the categories of
(i) low-income economies, (ii) lower-middle-income economies, and (iii) upper-middle-income
economies as developing countries. Therefore, we set α = 1/2 for these countries. We treat
high-income economies as developed countries and set α = 1/3 for these countries.11




t. We use the variable cgdpo (output-side real
GDP at current PPPs (in mil. 2005US$)) for GDP and the variable emp (number of persons
engaged (in millions)) for employment. Using these two variables, we calculate GDP per
worker (labor productivity) for each country. We use the variable ck (capital stock at
current PPPs (in mil. 2005US$)) for kit; and we use the variable hc (index of human capital
per person, based on years of schooling and returns to education) for hit. To provide the
results for Method 1, we set α = 1/3 for all the countries in the sample while for Method 2
we set α = 1/3 for each developed country and α = 1/2 for each developing country in the
sample.
3 Results and Comparison of Methods
It is difficult to assess whether or not a particular measure results in a “reasonable” compar-
ison of TFP levels across countries. Here, we provide some suggestive evidence. In Figure 3,
we display TFP levels obtained from the two different methods we employ as well as the PWT
measure, ctfp, for a select number of countries. First, we compare the relative TFP levels
obtained using Method 1 with the data provided in PWT. As mentioned before, PWT uses
country-and time-specific factor shares to generate the country-specific TFP levels. Their
measure, however, is very similar to the TFP measures we obtain by using the same factor
shares for both developed and developing countries (where α = 1/3). For Zimbabwe, for
example, PWT reports a TFP level that is 3 times that of the U.S. Using Method 1, we
obtain Zimbabwe’s TFP level to be twice as high as that of the U.S. On the other hand,
Method 2 generates fairly different TFP levels. For example, using Method 2, we obtain a
TFP level for Zimbabwe that is 60% of the U.S. level.12 Similar observations can be made
for Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, and Gabon. In all these cases, Method 1 delivers results
very similar to what is reported in PWT. Method 2, on the other hand, yields significantly
10Historical classifications by income are available at: siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/
Resources/OGHIST.xls
11According to our classification, there are 43 developed countries and 68 developing countries in our
111-country sample.
12It is also possible that due to some of the macroeconomic changes in Zimbabwe in recent years, reporting
of economic data may not have been reliable. This might have been especially the case after inflation peaked
at an astounding monthly rate of 79.6 billion percent in mid-November 2008 (Hanke and Kwok, 2009; Hanke
and Krus, 2012). In 2009, Zimbabwe started to adopt the U.S. dollar and became fully dollarized by law.
Between 2009 and 2011, Zimbabwe’s GDP growth averaged close to 10%, making it one of the world’s
fastest-growing countries, after recording a growth rate that was around minus 18% in 2008 (World Bank,
2016).
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lower TFP levels relative to the U.S.





























(c): Trinidad and Tobago













Figure 3: TFP levels in selected countries (relative to the U.S)








































Figure 4: TFP levels in BRIC countries (relative to the U.S)
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We have similar observations for the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China),
the group of emerging markets that encompass significant shares of the world’s land coverage,
population, and GDP (see Figure 4). For China, for 2011, PWT reports a TFP level that is
41% of the U.S. Using Method 1, we obtain China’s TFP level that is 34% of the U.S. On
the other hand, using Method 2, we obtain a TFP level for China that is 6% of the U.S. level
only. It is worth noting that a careful examination of the data leads Bai et al., (2006) to
estimate the labor share of income to be α = 1/2 for China. That is the value of the labor
share used in Method 2. Similar observations are made for Brazil, Russia, and India. In
all these cases, Method 1 delivers results very similar to what is reported in PWT, whereas
Method 2 generates significantly lower TFP levels relative to the U.S.
Next, we examine the time series for the TFP levels for these countries for the different
measures. Figure 5 shows the three different TFP levels as well as the GDP per worker for
these countries. All the series reported are relative to the U.S. All three TFP series are highly
correlated with each other. For example, the correlation between ctfp and TFP (Method 1 )
is 0.96 for Turkey. The corresponding correlation between ctfp and TFP (Method 2 ) is 0.94.
However, differences in TFP levels are striking. Reported TFP series in PWT 8.1 are higher
than those of our calculations for each method. For Turkey, in 2011, the value of ctfp is 1.01;
the value of TFP (Method 1 ) is 0.93; and the value of TFP (Method 2 ) is 0.15. Turkey’s
GDP per worker is 51% of the U.S. in 2011. Depending on the measure used, Turkey is
either more productive than the U.S. or significantly less productive than the U.S.





























(c): Trinidad and Tobago (1960-2011)







Figure 5: Productivity levels in selected countries
In Figure 6, we repeat the same exercise for the BRIC countries. Similar to the findings
before, TFP levels obtained with Method 1 yield results very similar to the data provided
by PWTs. Method 2, on the other hand, generates substantially lower levels of TFP and is
much closer to the GDP per worker measure provided for these countries.
8






























Figure 6: Productivity levels in BRIC countries
It may also be informative to look at the correlations between different TFP measures
and output per worker for all the countries in PWT. In Figure 7, we provide three scatter
plots of GDP per capita versus a particular TFP measure for the year 2010. Panels (a), (b)
and (c) use the TFP measures obtained from PWT, Method 1, and Method 2 respectively.
The observations we have summarized using a select number of countries, remains to be
valid when we examine the entire set of countries. The scatter plots using PWT data and
Method 1 yield similar results. Correlation between TFP and output per capita is higher
under Method 2. This method also generates a larger number of low TFP observations.13



















































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: TFP and GDP per worker levels in 2010
13See Appendix A for a summary of this data for all decades since 1960.
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We summarize the frequency distribution of productivity levels (relative to the U.S.)
of 111 countries in 2011 in Figure 8. Panel (a) in Figure 8 displays that there are 17
countries that have output per worker levels less than or equal to 10% of the U.S. output per
worker level in 2011. There are no countries in this region based on PWT data or Method
1 as summarized in panels (b) and (c). However, with Method 2 (panel (d)), there are 48
countries that have TFP levels less than or equal to 10% of the U.S. TFP level in 2011. In
panel (d), with Method 2, there are 66 countries that have TFP levels less than (or equal
to) 20% of the U.S. TFP level in 2011. On the other hand, according to the reported series
in PWT, there are only two countries (Burundi and Togo) with TFP levels less than 20% of
the U.S. TFP level in 2011. The corresponding number of countries is 8 if Method 1 is used
(Central Africa, Burundi, Togo, Tazmania, Niger, Mozambique, Senegal, and Lesotho).






(a): Output per worker






















(b): TFP (Penn data)

























(c): TFP (Method 1)

























(d): TFP (Method 2)
















Figure 8: Frequency distribution of productivity levels in 2011
Method 2, in most of the cases, results in lower estimates of TFP levels. It is, however,
difficult to know what kind of a frequency distribution is “reasonable”. Perhaps Method
2 results in too many countries with very low TFP levels compared to the U.S. What we
present simply provides evidence that TFP level comparisons are highly influenced by the
factor shares used. Among the countries examined in this paper, we argue that the detailed
studies conducted for Turkey and China do provide a more accurate calculation for their
factor shares. The resulting TFP levels for these countries are significantly different from
the ones in PWT and more similar to the ones obtained with Method 2.
Lastly, the simple average of TFP levels for 111 countries in 2011 is 0.41 if Method 2 is
employed. The corresponding average is 0.69 in PWT data and 0.64 if Method 1 is employed.
Figure 9 shows the unweighted averages for 68 developing countries in 2011. For example,
10
unweighted average of TFP levels for 68 developing countries in 2011 is 0.09 if Method 2 is
employed. The corresponding average is 0.55 in PWT data and 0.46 if Method 1 is employed.








Figure 9: Unweighted averages for 68 developing countries in 2011
Overall, we conclude that the relative TFP measure reported in PWT should be used
with caution. Differences in TFP measures obtained in the methods we report highlight the
importance of the factor shares used in these calculations. For country-specific studies, we
recommend a detailed analysis of the factor shares.
4 Concluding Remarks
One of the most important findings of the development accounting literature is that differ-
ences in measured TFP explain more than half of the cross-country differences in output per
worker (Jones and Romer, 2010). The Penn World Table is the most widely used source for
cross-country comparisons for these development and growth accounting procedures. There-
fore, studying the data reported in the PWT is important. In PWT 8.1, which is the latest
version of the Penn World Table, several developing countries stand out as outliers, with
high TFP levels, relative to the U.S. Estimates for some of these countries seem rather un-
likely when compared with other measures of productivity (such as output per worker). In
this paper, we argue that the measure used for the share of labor and capital for developing
versus developed countries is likely to be the culprit behind some of unexpected TFP cal-
culations in PWT. While in the construction of TFP levels, PWT does use country specific
factor shares, we show that their results are very similar to calculating TFP levels with a
Cobb-Douglas production function where capital and labor shares are assumed to be the
same across all countries.
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A simple modification, using constant labor share of 2/3 for developed countries and 1/2
for developing countries, generates more plausible estimates for differences in TFP levels
between the U.S and several developing countries. Measurement of factor income shares at
the country-specific level is a demanding task considering the data problems that are well-
cited, especially in developing countries. For example, as discussed widely in Gollin (2002),
additional imputations of the labor income of self-employed and family workers should be
made to adjust for the underestimation of the labor income share in the National Accounts
Statistics. However, the number of careful studies at the country level has been increasing
(see, for example, Bai et al., 2006; Bai and Qian, 2010 for China) that will make it possible
to generate more accurate TFP comparisons across countries.
We argue that reported TFP levels in Penn World Tables should be used with caution,
considering the possible measurement issues. We have dealt with a particular aspect of mea-
surement problem here in a very stylized manner. We are aware of the fact there are more
significant and bigger measurement problems for TFP levels, since cross-country differences
in GDP per worker, physical capital, and human capital contribute to cross-sectional gaps
in TFP levels. First, overstating of output in national income accounts is a source of mea-
surement issues (see the discussion on Puerto Rico in Baumol and Wolff, 1996; Hall and
Jones, 1999).14,15 Second, it is well known in the literature that some countries, because
of government inefficiency and corruption, might be systematically overestimating the in-
crease in physical capital taking place each period (see, for example, Prichett, 2000; Hsieh,
2002). Third, recent literature has incorporated the quality-adjusted measures of human
capital into the growth accounting analyses, i.e., the knowledge and skills of the population
as proxied by the consistent international test scores such as the Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA) (see Caselli, 2015 and Cubas et al., 2016 for a recent
cross-country quantitative analysis concerning such issues).16 Cubas et al. (2016) argue that
the quality of labor in rich countries is about twice as large as the quality in poor countries,
and this results smaller disparities in TFP levels compared to those obtained from growth
models using a Mincerian measure of labor quality. These are some of the possible avenues
for future empirical work on productivity measurement to understand TFP differences across
countries.
14Another important measurement issue is the relationship between intangible investment/capital and
measured productivity since the inclusion/exclusion of intangibles (such as research and development, soft-
ware, brands, etc.) changes the total output and the related calculations (see Corrado et al., 2009; McGrattan
and Prescott, 2010).
15GDP revisions, especially in poor countries, have been a constant topic of discussion in recent years. It
is reported in The Economist (2016) that “Nigeria’s GDP was revised up by 89% in 2014. Later that year,
Kenya’s GDP was revised up by 25%. Ghana’s GDP had been upgraded by 60% in 2010.”
16Providing a coherent criticism of measuring a nation’s human capital by school attainment, Hanushek
and Woessmann (2015) argue that internationally comparable measures of cognitive skills correlate highly
with economic growth, and cognitive skills can explain away large differences in growth rates between world
regions. Jones (2014) argues that ignoring complementarities and scarcity among human capital types would
understate human variation; and implementing an accounting with generalized human capital (i.e., allowing
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Appendix A
Countries (and the three-letter country codes) for 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2011 are: (1)
Argentina (ARG), (2) Armenia (ARM), (3) Australia (AUS), (4) Austria (AUT), (5) Burundi
(BDI), (6) Belgium (BEL), (7) Benin (BEN), (8) Bulgaria (BGR), (9) Bahrain (BHR),
(10) Bolivia (BOL), (11) Brazil (BRA), (12) Barbados (BRB), (13) Botswana (BWA), (14)
Central African Republic (CAF), (15) Canada (CAN), (16) Switzerland (CHE), (17) Chile
(CHL), (18) China, People’s Republic of (CHN), (19) Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), (20) Cameroon
(CMR), (21) Colombia (COL), (22) Costa Rica (CRI), (23) Cyprus (CYP), (24) Czech
Republic (CZE), (25) Germany (DEU), (26) Denmark (DNK), (27) Dominican Republic
(DOM), (28) Ecuador (ECU), (29) Egypt (EGY), (30) Spain (ESP), (31) Estonia (EST), (32)
Finland (FIN), (33) Fiji (FJI), (34) France (FRA), (35) Gabon (GAB), (36) United Kingdom
(GBR), (37) Greece (GRC), (38) Guatemala (GTM), (39) China: Hong Kong SAR (HKG),
(40) Honduras (HND), (41) Crotia (HRV), (42) Hungary (HUN), (43) Indonesia (IDN), (44)
India (IND), (45) Ireland (IRL), (46) Iran (Islamic Republic of) (IRN), (47) Iraq (IRQ),
(48) Iceland (ISL), (49) Israel (ISR), (50) Italy (ITA), (51) Jamaica (JAM), (52) Jordan
(JOR), (53) Japan (JPN), (54) Kazakhstan (KAZ), (55) Kenya (KEN), (56) Kyrgyzstan, (57)
Republic of Korea (KOR), (58) Kuwait (KWT), (59) Sri Lanka (LKA), (60) Lesotho (LSO),
(61) Lithuania (LTU), (62) Luxembourg (LUX), (63) Latvia (LVA), (64) China: Macao SAR
(MAC), (65) Morocco (MAR), (66) Republic of Moldova (MDA), (67) Mexico (MEX), (68)
Malta (MLT), (69) Mongolia (MNG), (70) Mozambique (MOZ), (71) Mauritania (MRT),
(72) Mauritius (MUS), (73) Malaysia (MYS), (74) Namibia (NAM), (75) Niger (NER), (76)
Netherlands (NLD), (77) Norway (NOR), (78) New Zealand (NZL), (79) Panama (PAN),
(80) Peru (PER), (81) Philippines (PHL), (82) Poland (POL), (83) Portugal (PRT), (84)
Paraguay (PRY), (85) Qatar (QAT), (86) Romania (ROM), (87) Russian Federation (RUS),
(88) Rwanda (RWA), (89) Saudi Arabia (SAU), (90) Senegal (SEN), (91) Singapore (SGP),
(92) Sierra Leone (SLE), (93) Serbia (SRB), (94) Slovakia (SVK), (95) Slovenia (SVN),
(96) Sweden (SWE), (97) Swaziland (SWZ), (98) Togo (TGO), (99) Thailand (THA), (100)
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Tajikistan (TJK), (101) Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), (102) Tunisia (TUN), (103) Turkey
(TUR), (104) Taiwan (TWN), (105) United Republic of Tanzania: Mainland (TZA), (106)
Ukraine (UKR), (107) Uruguay (URY), (108) United States (USA), (109) Venezuela (VEN),
(110) South Africa (ZAF), (111) Zimbabwe (ZWE).
Countries (and the three-letter country codes) for 1980 are: (1) Argentina (ARG), (2)
Australia (AUS), (3) Austria (AUT), (4) Burundi (BDI), (5) Belgium (BEL), (6) Benin
(BEN), (7) Bulgaria (BGR), (8) Bahrain (BHR), (9) Bolivia (BOL), (10) Brazil (BRA), (11)
Barbados (BRB), (12) Botswana (BWA), (13) Central African Republic (CAF), (14) Canada
(CAN), (15) Switzerland (CHE), (16) Chile (CHL), (17) China (CHN), (18) Côte d’Ivoire
(CIV), (19) Cameroon (CMR), (20) Colombia (COL), (21) Costa Rica (CRI), (22) Cyprus
(CYP), (23) Germany (DEU), (24) Denmark (DNK), (25) Dominican Republic (DOM), (26)
Ecuador (ECU), (27) Egypt (EGY), (28) Spain (ESP), (29) Finland (FIN), (30) Fiji (FJI),
(31) France (FRA), (32) Gabon (GAB), (33) United Kingdom (GBR), (34) Greece (GRC),
(35) Guatemala (GTM), (36) China: Hong Kong SAR (HKG), (37) Honduras (HND), (38)
Hungary (HUN), (39) Indonesia (IDN), (40) India (IND), (41) Ireland (IRL), (42) Iran (Is-
lamic Republic of), (43) Iraq (IRQ), (44) Iceland (ISL), (45) Israel (ISR), (46) Italy (ITA),
(47) Jamaica (JAM), (48) Jordan (JOR), (49) Japan (JPN), (50) Kenya (KEN), (51) Repub-
lic of Korea (KOR), (52) Kuwait (KWT), (53) Sri Lanka (LKA), (54) Lesotho (LSO), (55)
Luxembourg (LUX), (56) China: Macao SAR (MAC), (57) Morocco (MAR), (58) Mexico
(MEX), (59) Malta (MLT), (60) Mongolia (MNG), (61) Mozambique (MOZ), (62) Mau-
ritania (MRT), (63) Mauritius (MUS), (64) Malaysia (MYS), (65) Namibia (NAM), (66)
Niger (NER), (67) Netherlands (NLD), (68) Norway (NOR), (69) New Zealand (NZL), (70)
Panama (PAN), (71) Peru (PER), (72) Philippines (PHL), (73) Poland (POL), (74) Portu-
gal (PRT), (75) Paraguay (PRY), (76) Qatar (QAT), (77) Romania (ROM), (78) Rwanda
(RWA), (79) Saudi Arabia (SAU), (80) Senegal (SEN), (81) Singapore (SGP), (82) Sierra
Leone (SLE), (83) Sweden (SWE), (84) Swaziland (SWZ), (85) Togo (TGO), (86) Thailand
(THA), (87) Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), (88) Tunisia (TUN), (89) Turkey (TUR), (90)
Taiwan (TWN), (91) United Republic of Tanzania: Mainland (TZA), (92) Uruguay (URY),
(93) United States (USA), (94) Venezuela (VEN), (95) South Africa (ZAF), (96) Zimbabwe
(ZWE).
Countries (and the three-letter country codes) for 1970 are: (1) Argentina (ARG), (2)
Australia (AUS), (3) Austria (AUT), (4) Belgium (BEL), (5) Bulgaria (BGR), (6) Bahrain
(BHR), (7) Bolivia (BOL), (8) Brazil (BRA), (9) Barbados (BRB), (10) Canada (CAN), (11)
Switzerland (CHE), (12) Chile (CHL), (13) China (CHN), (14) Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), (15)
Cameroon (CMR), (16) Colombia (COL), (17) Costa Rica (CRI), (18) Cyprus (CYP), (19)
Germany (DEU), (20) Denmark (DNK), (21) Dominican Republic (DOM), (22) Ecuador
(ECU), (23) Egypt (EGY), (24) Spain (ESP), (25) Finland (FIN), (26) France (FRA), (27)
United Kingdom (GBR), (28) Greece (GRC), (29) Guatemala (GTM), (30) China: Hong
Kong SAR (HKG), (31) Honduras (HND), (32) Hungary (HUN), (33) Indonesia (IDN), (34)
India (IND), (35) Ireland (IRL), (36) Iran (Islamic Republic of) (IRN), (37) Iraq (IRQ), (38)
Iceland (ISL), (39) Israel (ISR), (40) Italy (ITA), (41) Jamaica (JAM), (42) Jordan (JOR),
(43) Japan (JPN), (44) Kenya (KEN), (45) Republic of Korea (KOR), (46) Kuwait (KWT),
(47) Sri Lanka (LKA), (48) Luxembourg (LUX), (49) Morocco (MAR), (50) Mexico (MEX),
(51) Malta (MLT), (52) Mozambique (MOZ), (53) Malaysia (MYS), (54) Niger (NER), (55)
Netherlands (NLD), (56) Norway (NOR), (57) New Zealand (NZL), (58) Panama (PAN),
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(59) Peru (PER), (60) Philippines (PHL), (61) Poland (POL), (62) Portugal (PRT), (63)
Paraguay (PRY), (64) Qatar (QAT), (65) Romania (ROM), (66) Saudi Arabia (SAU), (67)
Senegal (SEN), (68) Singapore (SGP), (69) Sweden (SWE), (70) Thailand (THA), (71)
Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), (72) Tunisia (TUN), (73) Turkey (TUR), (74) Taiwan (TWN),
(75) United Republic of Tanzania: Mainland (TZA), (76) Uruguay (URY), (77) United States
(USA), (78) Venezuela (VEN), (79) South Africa (ZAF), (80) Zimbabwe (ZWE).
Countries (and the three-letter country codes) for 1960 are as follows: (1) Argentina
(ARG), (2) Australia (AUS), (3) Austria (AUT), (4) Belgium (BEL), (5) Bolivia (BOL),
(6) Brazil (BRA), (7) Barbados (BRB), (8) Canada (CAN), (9) Switzerland (CHE), (10)
Chile (CHL), (11) China (CHN), (12) Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), (13) Cameroon (CMR), (14)
Colombia (COL), (15) Costa Rica (CRI), (16) Cyprus (CYP), (17) Germany (DEU), (18)
Denmark (DNK), (19) Dominican Republic (DOM), (20) Ecuador (ECU), (21) Egypt (EGY),
(22) Spain (ESP), (23) Finland (FIN), (24) France (FRA), (25) United Kingdom (GBR),
(26) Greece (GRC), (27) Guatemala (GTM), (28) China: Hong Kong SAR (HKG), (29)
Indonesia (IDN), (30) India (IND), (31) Ireland (IRL), (32) Iran (Islamic Republic of) (IRN),
(33) Iceland (ISL), (34) Israel (ISR), (35) Italy (ITA), (36) Jamaica (JAM), (37) Jordan
(JOR), (38) Japan (JPN), (39) Kenya (KEN), (40) Republic of Korea (KOR), (41) Sri Lanka
(LKA), (42) Luxembourg (LUX), (43) Morocco (MAR), (44) Mexico (MEX), (45) Malta
(MLT), (46) Mozambique (MOZ), (47) Malaysia (MYS), (48) Niger (NER), (49) Netherlands
(NLD), (50) Norway (NOR), (51) New Zealand (NZL), (52) Peru (PER), (53) Philippines
(PHL), (54) Portugal (PRT), (55) Romania (ROM), (56) Senegal (SEN), (57) Singapore
(SGP), (58) Sweden (SWE), (59) Thailand (THA), (60) Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), (61)
Tunisia (TUN), (62) Turkey (TUR), (63) Taiwan (TWN), (64) United Republic of Tanzania:
Mainland (TZA), (65) Uruguay (URY), (66) United States (USA), (67) Venezuela (VEN),
(68) South Africa (ZAF), (69) Zimbabwe (ZWE).
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Figure A.1: TFP and GDP per worker: Data Reported in PWT 8.1
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Figure A.2: TFP and GDP per worker: Method 1
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Figure A.3: TFP and GDP per worker: Method 2
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